1 week Ago By Mohsin Leghari
On April 23, India made an astonishing announcement: it would seek to suspend the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) with Pakistan, citing the Pahalgam terror attack as justification. In doing so, New Delhi risks detonating one of the world’s most successful water-sharing agreements and inviting retaliation not just from Islamabad, but from Beijing as well. What India portrays as a counter-terrorism move is, in fact, a profound legal and strategic miscalculation that could destabilise fragile river systems across continents.
The Indus Waters Treaty, brokered by the World Bank in 1960, remains one of the most resilient international agreements. It divided the Indus system’s six rivers: the eastern rivers (Sutlej, Beas, Ravi) to India, and the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) largely to Pakistan, with India permitted limited non-consumptive use. Crucially, Clause XII of the IWT requires mutual consent for any termination or modification; unilateral suspension is expressly barred.
This provision is vital because it ensures that neither country can make abrupt or unilateral changes to the treaty, which has stood the test of time. Affordable Healthcare Over 65 years, the treaty has survived wars, political crises, and diplomatic breakdowns, gaining immense legal weight. International law reinforces its sanctity.
In the Temple of Preah Vihear case (1962), the ICJ ruled that prolonged adherence to treaties prevents claims of invalidity. Similarly, the Qatar v. Bahrain case (2001) reaffirmed the necessity of honouring agreements despite territorial disputes.
These cases underscore that political tensions cannot justify suspending legal commitments, as India seems to propose. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) — although India is not a signatory — codifies customary principles requiring mutual consent for treaty termination (Article 54) and allowing suspension only in cases of a “fundamental change of circumstances” (Article 62). Further, ICJ judgments in Gabcíkovo–Nagymaros (1997) and Fisheries Jurisdiction (1974) rejected security grievances as grounds for suspending shared resource agreements.
These rulings make it clear that terrorism, no matter how tragic, does not meet the legal threshold to terminate such treaties. Common Interest Even if legality were set aside, India’s ability to hurt Pakistan’s water supply is extremely limited. Much of India’s western river infrastructure is concentrated on the Jhelum River.
Key projects include the Kishanganga Hydroelectric Project, commissioned in 2018 after 14 years of construction, which holds only 7.5 million cubic meters of live storage — far too small for meaningful regulation; the Uri-I and Uri-II Projects, which are run-of-the-river plants with negligible storage and minimal ability to manipulate flows; and the Lower Jhelum Project, another minor run-of-the-river project. On the Chenab River, India operates run-of-the-river projects like Baglihar, Salal, Dul Hasti, and the under-construction Ratle project.
These projects do not provide India serious leverage to disrupt the flow significantly. India’s position on the Indus River is even weaker, with minor projects like Nimoo Bazgo and Chutak offering no significant storage or manipulation potential. In short, India’s actual infrastructure on the Jhelum, Chenab, and Indus rivers amounts to a paper tiger incapable of coercing Pakistan through water.
Partners in Crime To meaningfully disrupt the river flows would require colossal infrastructure investments. Regulating even a fraction of the Jhelum’s 23 MAF annual flow demands large multipurpose dams. Projects like the Pakal Dul Dam (still incomplete after years of work for $1.
5 billion) illustrate the challenges. Kishanganga took 14 years and over $1 billion for minimal returns. Replicating such efforts at scale across the Jhelum, Chenab, or Indus would likely cost $15–20 billion, require 10–15 years, and face seismic, environmental, political, and legal hurdles.
Time and cost realities make India’s threat not just hollow — but impractical. India’s suspension threat creates a perilous precedent that could backfire spectacularly. As a lower riparian to China, India depends heavily on rivers originating in Chinese-controlled Tibet.
The Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo) and Sutlej (Langqen Zangbo) are lifelines for northeastern and northern India. Unlike India’s modest Jhelum dams, China has built or is planning massive infrastructure, including the Zangmu Dam, already operational on the Brahmaputra; the Motuo Mega-Dam, proposed with a staggering 30 MAF storage capacity — enough to reduce Brahmaputra dry-season flows into India by up to 60%; and the Senge Zangbo Dam, regulating upstream Sutlej flows into Himachal Pradesh and Punjab. Cartoon If China adopts India’s logic, suspending water sharing due to “security” or “political” concerns, the consequences for India would be severe and immediate.
Unlike India, China has the technical and financial capacity, having invested nearly $1 trillion under the Belt and Road Initiative in similar projects. In such a scenario, India’s invocation of terrorism to suspend river obligations would severely undercut its diplomatic protest capabilities. China could and likely would demand what India demands for itself.
The dangers do not stop at South Asia’s borders. If India successfully breaks a long-standing water treaty citing political grievances, it risks setting a catastrophic precedent for the entire world. Globally, over 300 transboundary river agreements govern critical water flows: the Nile Basin Agreement between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia; the Mekong River Agreement among Southeast Asian states; and the Danube River Conventions in Europe, to name a few.
These frameworks are already fragile. A single breach of the norm that “water treaties survive political disputes” could unleash a domino effect of treaty collapses, sparking water wars from Africa to Southeast Asia. Indus at the Brink India, which relies on delicate agreements with Nepal, Bangladesh, and Bhutan over the Ganges and Brahmaputra basins, would itself be among the earliest victims of this new, dangerous world.
Thus, India’s action not only destabilises South Asia — it strikes at the heart of global water security. The Indus Waters Treaty stands as a legal and diplomatic cornerstone, not only for South Asia but for global water governance. India’s attempt to suspend it is legally indefensible, practically futile, and strategically reckless.
With limited infrastructure on the Jhelum, even less on the Chenab and Indus, and the looming threat of Chinese upstream control, India gains little and risks much. Instead of jeopardising a 65-year-old framework that has ensured peace amid water scarcity, India and Pakistan must recommit to dialogue, diplomacy, and regional stability. With China watching closely, and the world facing mounting water challenges, cooperation, not unilateralism, is the only prudent path.
Transboundary water agreements are indeed critical, with 263 international river basins supporting 40% of the world’s population. The IWT is often cited as a model of cooperation despite conflict. India’s agreements with Nepal and Bangladesh (e.
g., the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty) are cooperative but fragile, and a global norm shift could strain them. To safeguard global water security, the world must prioritise cooperation and uphold the sanctity of agreements like the IWT.
Mohsin Leghari The writer is a former Senator, MPA, MNA, and former Minister of Irrigation Punjab. Tags: india indus.
