In South Asia, where borders are old and wounds are older, India has long claimed itself as the natural leader of South Asia, aspiring to steer the region’s political, economic, and security architecture. Bolstered by its growing economy, expanding diplomatic clout, and active global outreach, New Delhi’s narrative has often revolved around the idea of regional integration under its leadership. Yet, what is increasingly emerging across the South Asian neighborhood is a noticeable discontent — a shared discomfort among several neighboring states that perceive India’s strategic conduct not as leadership, but as an overstretch bordering on hegemony.
In recent months, a visible shift has been taking place in Bangladesh. The interim government, under acting PM Muhammad Yunus, has expressed concerns over the previous administration’s proximity to India. On the sidelines of the recently held BIMSTEC summit, Yunus reportedly raised the issue of former PM Sheikh Hasina Wajid’s political exile in India, requesting cooperation for her return to face pending legal challenges.
While India’s silence on the matter has been interpreted as tacit support for Hasina, Bangladesh’s domestic politics seems to be entering a post-Hasina phase, less reliant on New Delhi. Moreover, India’s unilateral decision to revoke the land-based transshipment facility for Bangladeshi exports to third state has been met with criticism, seen as an economic snub to its eastern neighbor. Before Terrorists Strike In the Maldives, the ‘India Out’ movement continues to gather momentum.
It originated as a civic protest against India’s military presence and perceived interference in domestic politics, but has since evolved into a larger nationalistic assertion. The election of President Mohamed Muizzu, who ran on a platform of restoring Maldivian sovereignty, symbolized a turning point. While practical necessities have forced continued economic cooperation with India — including a $100 million treasury rollover and a $400 million currency swap — the political messaging remains firm: Maldivians are wary of India’s footprint on their soil.
Nepal presents a more nuanced case. While cultural, religious, and linguistic ties remain strong, recent years have seen a spike in tensions over border disputes, particularly in the Kalapani-Limpiyadhura region. The release of new political maps by both states, staking claim over disputed territories, ignited nationalist sentiment in Kathmandu.
Although diplomatic channels remain active, the sentiment on the ground reflects a growing discomfort with India’s perceived overreach. Kathmandu’s increased engagements with China, particularly in infrastructure development, signal a desire for alternative partnerships and greater strategic independence. Quest for Social Protection Relations with Sri Lanka are also being tested.
Although India was one of the first state to respond to Colombo’s economic crisis, including defense assistance and energy cooperation, the perception among sections of Sri Lankan society is that India has used the crisis to expand its strategic influence. The leasing of port terminals, energy projects, and defense agreements have been viewed with suspicion, with critics accusing the Sri Lankan government of trading sovereignty for survival. It is within this complex regional setting that Pakistan continues to counter India’s strategic hostility.
Bilateral relations have remained hostile for years, but what makes the case of Pakistan unique is the degree of mistrust rooted in both past and ongoing issues. Pakistan has held India responsible for supporting insurgent groups operating within its borders, particularly in Balochistan. The arrest of Indian national Kulbhushan Jadhav in 2016 — a former naval officer accused of espionage and sabotage — reinforced Islamabad’s concerns that India is engaged in a covert campaign to destabilize the state.
Balochistan has been a focal point of Pakistan’s security discourse, and any external interference is treated as a threat to national unity. India’s alleged support for dissident Baloch groups has fueled suspicions that New Delhi’s strategic calculus is not merely reactive but driven by a long-term plan to weaken Pakistan from within. These suspicions have been echoed in multiple national and international forums by Pakistani officials, who argue that India’s attempts to portray itself as a peace-loving regional power are disingenuous.
Karachi’s Reckless Driving In addition to that, revocation of Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019 has further strained relations, as Pakistan viewed this move as a blatant violation of international law, particularly United Nations Security Council resolutions calling for a plebiscite in the disputed territory. India’s unilateral action was perceived as a betrayal of its commitments, not only to Pakistan but to the international community. Despite repeated calls for dialogue and peaceful resolution, India has remained inflexible, further isolating itself from regional peace initiatives.
Compounding these diplomatic tensions, India’s internal political trajectory, led by the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), has also contributed to regional unease. The ideological leanings of the BJP, grounded in Hindutva, have led to concerns among minority communities within India and among its Muslim-majority neighbors. For states like Pakistan, Bangladesh, and even sections of Sri Lanka and the Maldives, this ideological shift adds another layer of suspicion toward India’s regional ambitions.
A state that positions itself as a secular democracy yet follows an exclusionary domestic agenda cannot be expected to lead an inclusive regional order. The Rising Cost of Education Taken together, these developments reflect a broader and more telling regional pattern: India’s ambition to act as South Asia’s central power is no longer going uncontested. Rather than embracing Indian leadership, regional actors are asserting sovereignty, exploring alternative alignments, and critically reassessing their strategic options.
In this evolving landscape, China has positioned itself as a credible and pragmatic partner for many South Asian states, offering economic incentives without overt political conditions. From infrastructure financing in Nepal and Sri Lanka to increased trade cooperation with Bangladesh and the Maldives, Beijing is quietly — yet effectively — reshaping the region’s balance of power. While India retains geographic centrality and significant resources, its strategic indispensability is waning.
Its inability to foster trust and deliver equitable partnerships has become its most profound limitation. If New Delhi aspires to gain regional relevance and counterbalance China’s growing influences, it must fundamentally recalibrate its approach — one grounded not in dominance, but in diplomacy, mutual respect, and shared development. Dr.
Gul.i.Ayesha Bhatti The writer is a current affairs analyst and faculty member at the National University of Science and Technology (NUST), Islamabad.
She can be reached at [email protected] Tags: india strategic limits.
Politics
India’s Strategic Limits

In South Asia, where borders are old and wounds are older, India has long claimed itself as the natural leader of South Asia, aspiring to steer the region’s political, economic, and security architecture.