2 weeks Ago By Thilina Walpola
Evolving ethnic conflict and emerging Indian factorThe general elections of 1977, which Sirimavo Bandaranaike had called, on July 21 saw another of those dramatic swings of the political pendulum, which had characterized Sri Lanka’s political history since independence. It saw the governing party, the SLFP, reduced from 91 to eight seats. The UNP, which while in opposition between 1970-77 had only 17 seats, won 140 seats in this election.
It secured a 5/6th majority in the House, at the time a record for any parliamentary democracy in the world.The result of the 1977 polls, was interpreted by J R and most people as an indictment of the electorate’s disenchantment at the ‘statist’ policies of the United Front government. Moreover, the extension of the life of Parliament by two years, from 1975 to 1977, and the more or less continuous emergency under which the country had been ruled, had turned the majority of people against the United Front government.
The left partners, the LSSP and the CP, had moved out of government at the closing stages.Many urgent tasks awaited J R Jayewardene. Foremost in his thinking was the economy which had to be freed of the controls which had constrained it.
Space had to be found for the private sector to revive and grow. The infrastructure of roads, ports, irrigation and power, on which future development was to rest had to be rehabilitated. J R planned and launched some massive development works, the centerpiece of which was the Mahaweli ganga accelerated programme of integrated irrigation and power development.
It literally changed the face of central Sri Lanka. His principal colleagues in this surge of development were Gamini Dissanayake and Lalith Athulathmudali in irrigation and port development respectively, and Premadasa to whom he entrusted a wide programme of rural housing and urban renewal and rehabilitation.But the infusion of a new dynamism in directing this major policy shift from a controlled to an open economy needed, in J R’s view, the reform of the 1972 Constitution.
The huge majority which the government had secured, guaranteed that these far-reaching structural changes could be effected. A series of amendments to the existing Constitution, pushed through in 1977 and 1978 itself (with the help of the more than 2/3rd parliamentary majority J R had secured), saw the Westminster system of prime ministerial government radically altered. The president’s role became preeminent with the executive being endowed with enormous power.
The critics called it Bonapartism’ looking at the concentration of power in the hands of the president. The president was henceforth to be head of state and head of government combining both the `dignified’ and ‘efficient’ aspects of state leadership. The prime minister’s role was henceforth to be no more than that of a minister.
Executive power was to be exercised by the president. He could choose his Cabinet from among the members of parliament.The reforms also brought in proportional representation in the election of members of parliament, in place of the first-past-the-post system which had prevailed since independence.
Proportional representation not only eliminated the possibility of massive swings at the elections, but also locked in the 1978 constitution into an almost impossible-to-change situation because of the difficulty of ever again obtaining a two-third majority in Parliament.Attempts at Resolving the Ethnic Question – The District Development Councils of 1980J R soon came up with a proposal for limited decision making at the level of the district based on the experience of the District Political Authority and the District Minister System. This was the development councils’ idea which was more an attempt at democratizing decentralized power rather than the devolution of power.
The final form of the Act which came out of the work of a commission headed by Victor Tennekoon, a former Chief Justice gave limited powers to the councils approximating those carried out by village councils and town councils. So it was not much but at least provided members of parliament with some local means of funding and power in local development.J R chose me along with a few secretaries to assist in the work of identifying work which could be assigned to the development councils.
I was amazed at how little of their vast powers the ministers of the government were prepared to ‘surrender’ to the councils. And much of what was given could of course be yet taken back because the councils would be chaired by the district minister who were all government members of parliament.Although the council’s powers were extremely limited the TULF was prepared to make it work.
However the experience of the DDC elections in Jaffna scheduled to be held in June 1981 but extensively flawed as a result of the exertions of some prominent UNP ministers, and the subsequent burning of the Jaffna Library by reportedly the police, did not augur well for the success of this initiative.The moderates in the TULF had to give in to the young extremist militants in the wings and the downward spiral of events which culminated in the violence of 1983 became unstoppable.The Indian Factor and the Response of J R JayewardeneIndia’s involvement especially between 1980 and 1989 in the Sri Lankan ethnic issue was precipitated, I think, directly by the 1983 happenings.
Although I was not in the country at the time and was in London for five years, from 1984 to 1989, I always had the feeling that India would involve itself more and more in Sri Lankan affairs as the conflict with the Tamil militant groups intensified. During the violence of 1983 itself, while I was handling Essential Services, there was constant concern being expressed by both the Indian High Commission in Colombo, and the official visitors from India on the state of affairs relating to the Tamil community.The refugee camps and welfare centers were under my charge, and I recall in particular in 1983, the visit of G Parathasarathy – one of Indira Gandhi’s closest advisors – who wanted to see me in regard to the conditions of the Welfare Centers.
I spent two days with him going around the camps and listening with him to the tirade of complaints of their sufferings during the July riots and their lack of hope about the future. At a meeting with the Indian High Commissioner, Parathasarathy expressed his deep concern at the unsatisfactory situation and referred to India needing to concern itself of the plight of Tamil people in Sri Lanka.This led the Indira Gandhi administration to deliberately build up the strength of the Tamil militants by training and supplying arms in order that they, the militants, could withstand any more attacks against them by either odd, lawless groups like in 1993 or by agencies of the state itself.
References made from time to time in books on India’s involvement in Sri Lanka by Indian authors or in the Indian media would make us believe that many of these efforts were orchestrated by RAW – the Research and Analysis Wing of the Indian intelligence services, which apparently operated close to the prime minister’s office.Looked at from the Tamil side one could come to the conclusion that the strategy paid off. It is indeed curious that, although since 1983 there had been several incidents where the loss on the government side has been far greater than the 13 soldiers ambushed at Thinnaveli in July 1983 (which precipitated the riots), there have been virtually no retaliatory attacks on Tamil civilians in Colombo or in the other Sinhala majority areas since then.
Colombo was attacked several times by the LTTE since 1995, in particular – the bombing of the Galadari Hotel, the attack on the Central Bank, the armed incursion into the Oil Installations at Kolonnawa, and even the attempt at ramming a lorry into the Dalada Maligawa in Kandy and there was never a backlash by the Sinhalese against the Tamil civilian population in Colombo. The popular explanation to this is that those who may have perpetuated such action have now become older and wiser and therefore desisted from carrying out such tit-for-tat operations. Of course another explanation would be that the existence of a potentially effective `from the Tamil point of view’ further counter-strike by LTTE forces might also be a reason for deterring such vigilante groups from contemplating any such action.
The Monarchical TraditionJ R Jayewardene liked to trace his origins back 300 years to a family known as the Tudugala’s. To the name Tudugala was added the name Wijewardene on the conferment of a British honour, at the beginning of the 20th century. J R’s interest in history and lineage was pervasive.
When he became the first executive president of Sri Lanka in 1978, he used to take pride in saying that he was the last in the line of rulers of the island in an unbroken succession dating back over 2500 years!When J R was minister of state in the Dudley Senanayake Government of 1965-70, a former Government Archivist, H O Paulusz was requested to publish a book on the Tudugala family’. This contains an interesting history of J R’s mother’s ancestors.The Tudugala saga goes back to the 17th century when two brothers, Tennekoon Mudiyanse and Tennekoon Madummaralla, both great-grandsons of Prince Vidiya Bandara distinguished themselves as generals in King Rajasinghe II’s army.
But that success also led, as in many other instances in Rajasinghe’s time, to their downfall.Tennekoon Mudiyanse was driven into exile and his brother imprisoned and probably executed. Madummaralla’s son, Tennekoon Appuhamy, who was the Disawa of Sabaragamuwa, was also executed by the King in 1766.
However, his wife and children, who were residing then in the Dutch Provinces, prospered and the family history was traced through the Dutch records and land tombus, a register containing particulars regarding land ownership established during Dutch rule.There are records of Don Philip Tudugala who was born in 1804 in the village of Tudugala near Kalutara. Don Philip, who was the founder of the modern branch of the family came to live in Colombo in the village of Sedawatte on the banks of the Kelani ganga.
He soon became one of the richest Sinhalese merchants of the time.It was building boom time in the city of Colombo, after the construction of the harbour breakwater and Don Peter Tudugala prospered from the city’s development, supplying timber, sand and bricks which came down the Kelani ganga to Sedawatte. He invested his income in real estate and took on the name of Wijewardene, when conferred with an honour by the British government.
Don Philip left seven sons and two daughters. Among these were DC and DR; DC, the author of the Revolt in the Temple, DR (Don Richard), the founder of the Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd. (Lake House).
The others achieved distinction in commerce and other professions.His eldest daughter married a Jayewardene, who became a Justice. J R ( Junius Richard) was his son.
Helena Dep Weerasinghe, the widow of Don Philip Tudugala and J R’s grandmother, was the benefactor of the ancient vihare, the Rajamaha Vihare of Kelaniya. The influence of the family was paramount in the area, and when J R got interested in politics, it was only natural that he chose Kelaniya as his constituency.(Excerpted from Rendering Unto Caesar by Bradman Weerakoon).
