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Centers for Disease Control (CDC) scientist in a protective air-tight suit pipetting specimens, ...
More Biosafety Level-4 (BSL-4) laboratory, Atlanta, Georgia, 2005. Image courtesy Centers for Disease Control. (Photo by Smith Collection/Gado/Getty Images) On April 29, 2025, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases within the NIH put the brakes on research at its high containment lab (known as the Integrated Research Facility) at Fort Detrick, Maryland for a safety stand-down.
The lab studies high consequence pathogens, such as Ebola virus and SARS-CoV-2. In a report from WIRED magazine, Bradley Moss, communication director for NIH’s office of research services noted “This decision follows identification and documentation of personnel issues involving contract staff that compromised the facility’s safety culture, prompting this research pause.” The IRF’s director, Dr.
Connie Schmaljohn, an experienced scientist and expert on hantaviruses, was also placed on administrative leave. No further information on the cause of the safety stand-down has been reported by the NIH; however, Fox News subsequently cited an anonymous source, who stated the cause was a “lover’s spat” between facility researchers, where one individual poked holes in another’s protective equipment. “That individual has since been fired, the official indicated.
” The NIH public affairs office did not respond to a query for more information. High consequence pathogens are “serious and deadly agents that pose a substantial threat to domestic and global security.” Many are difficult to treat and frequently do not have a preventive vaccine.
Consequently, they require specialized containment facilities to study them safely, because they are known to infect laboratorians. Some additional examples include Marburg and Lassa viruses and anthrax bacteria. These are some of the deadliest infectious pathogens on the planet, with death rates that can range from approximately 25 to 90%.
Laboratories that work with human or animal samples are categorized at different “ biosafety levels ,” from BSL-1 to BSL-4, with each increase in level corresponding to increasingly dangerous pathogens and concomitant increases in required safety measures. Most hospital microbiology labs work at the BSL-2 level, where deadly organisms can be worked on, such as staphylococcus, streptococcus, or even HIV, but those disease can be handled safely by working under a microbiology safety cabinet (or “hood”) with HEPA filtration, wearing gloves and a lab coat and washing your hands when you leave the lab. The biggest risk to the laboratorians would be through a splash or penetration of the skin with a sharp instrument or needle.
At the BSL-3 level, we cross into a level where “containment” measures are needed to protect the laboratorians. Pathogens at this level are known to infect through the air and therefore require specialized air handling and personal protective equipment, such as a respirator and gowns as well as decontamination measures upon exiting the lab. Organisms worked on at the BSL-3 level, although potentially deadly, such as plague or tularemia, usually have a specific vaccine or treatment.
When we move into BSL-4, we are at maximum containment. At BSL-4, we separate the person from the pathogen by either a fully encapsulated “space” suit or by working with the organism inside a glove box. Pathogens at this level are usually highly deadly and generally have limited or no vaccines or treatments.
Viruses like Ebola, Lassa and Marburg are handled under BSL-4 precautions. There are many reasons to study these pathogens. Some are considered possible biological weapons threats.
Others cause disease in endemic regions around the world, particularly in less-developed regions, such as Africa and South America. These pathogens are deadly and can cause outbreaks, so there has been a concerted effort in the military, at the NIH and academic institutions to 1) understand the ecology of where they exist in nature, 2) determine how they spread and cause disease and 3) develop countermeasures, including ways to diagnose, treat and prevent them. Whether the public is at risk largely depends on what the problem is.
I’ve written previously that there are four basic ways a pathogen can “ escape ” a lab: through the air, human exposure, hitching a ride on an animal or inanimate object and through deliberate release. The most likely is through human exposure from a lab accident, where a laboratorian becomes infected in the lab with something contagious and once they become ill, they can spread it to others. In this situation, the idea that a laboratorian would intentionally compromise a colleague’s protective suit, thus putting them at potential risk of infection with a deadly agent is unconscionable and incredibly serious.
Having said that, unless the individual whose protective suit was breached became infected, there is no risk to the public from a pathogen. In my own personal experience working in a containment laboratory and managing laboratory safety stand-downs , these can be mandated after a specific safety breach has been identified, a general attitude or “culture” of the institution has been lax regarding safety procedures or even in response to a specific political issue or new safety mandate. Usually, the first thing that happens is an assessment of what the problem is and if anyone is at risk.
If there are specific issues identified, either with safety protocols or how the workers are following them, then re-training of the individuals or the entire institute is undertaken. If there are mechanical problems with the facility, such as with the air handling systems, decontamination machinery, such as autoclaves or other methods to decontaminate instruments or other equipment, then those need to be fixed. Once any urgent issues are handled, it is in the best interest of the institute to provide more information on what led to the stand-down.
Absent that, it is difficult to make a true assessment of public risk and also to reduce speculation as to the actual cause. A stand-down can cause significant disruption to ongoing experiments, especially if they include work with animals that have received a vaccine or that have been infected with a specific pathogen. The longer a stand-down lasts, the more damaging the disruption can be.
Therefore, the key is to get to the root of the problem, fix it, restore the public trust and resume the important work as soon as feasible..
